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FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS IN CLASS
ACTIONS, AND THE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Committee on ProfessionalResponsibility, Association of
the Bar of the City of New York t

1. Introduction
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct' (the "Model
Rules") and its precursors, the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility 2 (the "Code") and the Canons of Professional Ethics3 (the "Canons"), evolved in the context of a lawyer, probably a sole
practitioner, advocating the cause of an individual client, generally in
a litigated dispute, for a fee. 4 The New York Code of Professional
Responsibility 5 (the "New York Code"), based as it is on the Code
and the Canons, reflects a similar vision. The various codes developed
a series of guidelines covering the payment of fees and disbursements
designed to preserve the role of the lawyer as a zealous, though somewhat disinterested, advocate of his or her client's positions.6 These
rules have generally been carried through to the present. Thus, the
New York Code retains rules that prohibit a lawyer from having a
financial interest in a matter,7 that prohibit contingent fees in some
situations,8 and that require a client to be responsible for court costs
and other fees.9 Parallel developments regulate fee-splitting among
t December 1992. The members of the Committee at the time this Report was
written are listed in Appendix A.
1. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
2. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
3. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
4. Vincent R. Johnson, Ethical Limitations on Creative Financingof Mass Tort Class
BROOK. L. REV. 539, 541 n.3 (1988) (citing GEOFFREY HAZARD, ETHICS IN
THE PRACTICE OF LAW XV (1978)); see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS § 2.6.2, at 54-55 (1986).

Actions, 54

5. N.Y.

COMP. CODES

R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200 (1992) [hereinafter N.Y.

CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY].

6. But see Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility,
90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977), in which Professor Morgan argues that the codes are not
so much expressions of high ideals as they are perhaps a self-serving device promulgated
by the legal profession. Thus, he views the ban on contingent fees in criminal cases as a
device to protect lawyers from being pressured by clients to bear such risks. Id. at 734.
7. N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, DR 5-103(a).
8. Id.
9. See id. DR 5-103(b).
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lawyers,' ° prohibit fee-splitting between lawyers and non-lawyers,"'
and mandate that fees bear a reasonable relationship to the services
12
performed.
Lawyers representing plaintiffs in class actions are increasingly
finding that the needs of the class action-particularly as to funding
and other financial arrangements-are in conflict with the Code. Unlike the paradigm on which the various codes are based, plaintiffs in
class actions are usually remote, often nameless and have no meaningful economic interest in pursuing individual claims. Furthermore,
class actions can be extremely expensive to carry to the point where
recovery of costs can be realized from a settlement fund or judgment.
In recent years, federal courts have begun to favor the public policy
considerations supporting class actions when the financial needs of the
class action have come in conflict with the Code.
The evolution of the modem class action began with the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the late 1930's and accelerated dramatically after the amendments were promulgated in 1966,
particularly the adoption of Rule 23(b)(3). 13 The basic theory behind
Rule 23, and the old Equity Rule 38 from which it was drawn, was
that it allowed more efficient adjudication in situations where a large
number of claimants sought relief based on the same facts. Secondarily, class actions held the promise of permitting vindication of claims
that, assessed individually, might not be economically justified in light
of the costs of litigation. Thus, class action lawsuits serve broad remedial goals and also promote efficiency by avoiding multiplicitous
14
lawsuits over the same issue.
The prosecution of a class action raises conflicts between a broad,
remedial approach to civil justice and the simple model from which
the Code evolved.15 As the demands of administering large complex
class action litigation come in conflict with the paradigm, traditional
concepts need to be rethought or amended in the interests of furthering the social benefits of class actions.
Although the early skirmishes between the needs of class actions
10. Id. DR 2-107.
11. Id. DR 3-102.
12. N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, DR 2-106.
13. FED. R. CIv. P. 23. But see Arthur R. Miller, Comment, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem", 92 HARV. L.
REV. 664 (1979) (arguing that the proliferation of class actions following the 1966
amendments was basically unrelated to the amendments to Rule 23).
14. See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989
UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 43.
15. David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing IndividualJustice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987).
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and the Code were generally decided in favor of the Code, 6 the Code
is increasingly seen as creating unwarranted roadblocks to the financing and maintenance of class actions. Thus, in a line of cases concerning financial incentives to class representatives, the federal courts have
permitted such payments when class representatives take more risks
than other members of the class or when they put more effort into the
prosecution of class actions than the usual class representative could
be expected to provide. Similarly, in a line of cases culminating in
Rand v. Monsanto Co. ,17 federal courts have found the Code's prohibition against advancing costs on behalf of clients inapplicable if it
serves as an impediment to prosecuting the case as a class action. Finally, in the Agent Orange case,II a federal district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered the propriety of "creative
financing by the attorneys" whereby attorneys could be allowed to
"invest" in the action and receive a rate of return on their investment
apart from the time and effort the attorney put into the litigation. 9
The following three sections of this report address these issues
raised by the conflicts between the need to finance and maintain a
class action and the restrictive provisions of the Code.2°
II. Ethical Considerations of Plaintiff Incentive Awards
Incentive awards for named class representatives have attracted increasing attention and some criticism.2 Incentive awards are allot16. See, e.g., In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 93 F.R.D. 485 (D. Md.
1982).
17. 926 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1991).
18. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
rev'd, 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987).
19. Id. at 1462; see Johnson, supra note 4, at 552-53.
20. This report does not discuss the effect that the Code may have on non-financial
aspects of prosecuting a class action, such as issues of solicitation of class members, and
disqualification on grounds of conflict of interest. Class actions raise other ethical issues
that are not discussed in this report. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89
(1981) (upholding reversal of district court order, which had completely banned all communications between plaintiffs' attorneys and potential class members without prior judicial approval, as a violation of First Amendment); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that, in the context of class action litigation,
the traditional rule of disqualifying an attorney from representing one of two or more
former joint clients whose interests subsequently become adverse must give way to a balancing test for resolving questions of disqualification; a strict disqualification rule "would
substantially diminish the efficacy of class actions as a method of dispute resolution").
21. See Andrew Blum, Class Actions' New Wrinkle: Bonus Awards, NAT'L L. J., Oct.
7, 1991, at 1; Categories of Incentives, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 7, 1991, at 38; Clinton A. Krislov, Scrutiny of the Bounty: Incentive Awards for Plaintiffs in Class Litigation, 78 ILL. B.
J. 286 (1990), available in Westlaw, ILJB Database; Jerold S. Solovy et al., The Head of
the Class, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 27, 1990, at 13; see also Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P.
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ments to named plaintiffs in class actions over and above the amount
of any judgment received by the other members of the class. Courts
which have awarded such bonuses have done so for three reasons: 1)
to compensate for the initiation and maintenance of the lawsuit and as
a means to encourage a particular type of litigation; 2) to compensate
for consultative services rendered in the litigation-services which require something greater than the regular obligations of a class representative; and 3) to compensate for stronger individual claims on the
merits.
This Committee believes that while incentive awards can serve
laudable purposes, such awards may in some cases encourage meritless litigation or raise possible conflicts between named plaintiffs and
their fellow class members as well as their lawyers. The challenge is
to work out guidelines that will permit such awards only in appropriate cases.
A.

Compensation for Being a Plaintiff

1.

The Cases

The most frequent rationales for approving incentive awards to
class action plaintiffs are: 1) to compensate them for the time and
effort spent preparing for the litigation; and 2) to compensate them
for assuming the financial risk of the costs of the litigation.22
Courts have been particularly willing to award such compensation
to reward individual plaintiffs for accepting personal risks and to encourage particular types of litigation. In civil rights cases, for example, courts typically cite as a reason for incentive awards the
significant benefits afforded the class members of having their rights
protected, and the courage exhibited by the named plaintiff in bringing the action in the face of possible personal repercussions.23
Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney'sRole in Class Action and DerivativeLitigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 65 n.194 (1991).
22. See, e.g., Enterprise Energy Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 137
F.R.D. 240, 251 (S.D. Ohio 1991); In re Dun & Bradstreet Credit Servs. Customer Litig.,
130 F.R.D. 366, 374 (S.D. Ohio 1990); Golden v. Shulman, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,060, at 90,954 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
However, the need to provide an incentive for a plaintiff to assume the cost of litigation
has been minimized by recent authority allowing plaintiffs' attorneys to advance expenses
of the litigation with the expectation that the lawyer will be reimbursed only if the plaintiff is successful. See Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 1991). For
example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently affirmed the denial of an
incentive award because, among other reasons, the named plaintiff "bore [only] a slight
risk of being made liable for sanctions, costs, or other fees .... " In re Continental Ill.
Secs. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 571-72 (7th Cir. 1992)(citing Rand, 926 F.2d 596).
23. See In re Jackson Lockdown, 107 F.R.D. 703, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (awarding
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The named plaintiffs in In re Jackson Lockdown24 and Women's
Committee for Equal Employment Opportunity v. National Broadcasting Co." are typical of the class representatives who have been
awarded incentive compensation. In Jackson Lockdown, state prison
inmates initiated a complaint against prison officials for unjust treatment during a "lockdown" in response to a prison riot. The class
action was brought despite the named plaintiffs' valid fear of retaliation. The court described the named plaintiffs as "active protesters
[as] contrasted to [plaintiffs who later joined the suit] who were
merely passive and indicated no particular desire to bring an end to a
discriminatory policy." 26 In Women's Committee, the named plaintiffs risked losing their jobs by creating and funding the organization
that commenced the employment discrimination action.27
Courts have also been willing to award bonuses to representative
plaintiffs in securities and antitrust cases to encourage such suits. For
example, in Sherin v. Smith" and In re Con tinental/Midatlantic
Shareholders Litigation,29 the courts found that the plaintiffs had
helped enforce the federal securities laws by bringing the suits. In In
re FirstJersey Securities, Inc. Securities Litigation,3" the court gave as
one of its reasons for approving an incentive award the fact that the
plaintiff had braved personal risk; the defendant had threatened him
with a sizable counter-suit.
The reason most frequently given for incentive awards in this category of cases is the effort required of the named plaintiff in an action
which ultimately benefits the entire class. For example, in Huguley v.
bonus to "reward[i] members of a class who protested and helped bring rights to a group
who had been victims of discrimination" in suit for violation of prisoners' rights); Women's Comm. for Equal Employment Opportunity v. National Broadcasting Co., 76
F.R.D. 173, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("[T]he prospect of a substantial personal recovery will
encourage aggrieved persons to bring lawsuits which are likely to advance the national
policy of eliminating discrimination in employment.") (Title VII action); Krislov, supra
note 21, at 15 of 23 ("[T]hey are the reward for those who put themselves at risk on the
class' behalf, sometimes when no one else knew, cared, or was courageous enough to
assume the risk,").
24. 107 F.R.D. 703.
25. 76 F.R.D. 173.
26. 107 F.R.D. at 710.
27. 76 F.R.D. at 181; see also Lo Re v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1366 (1979) (granting separate award where plaintiff-employees "initiated
this action at some risk to their own job security and to the good will of their coworkers").
28. [Transfer Binder 1987-1988] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,582, at 97,609 (E.D.
Pa. 1987).
29. No. CIV.A.86-6872, 1987 WL 16678, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 1987).
30. No. MDL 681, 1989 WL 69901, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 1989).
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General Motors Corp.,31 the court approved a bonus comprised of a
pooled fund of over $300,000 to be shared by the eighty-eight named
plaintiffs and plaintiffs prepared to act as witnesses in a Title VII case.
The court reasoned that they were "entitled to more consideration...
because of the onerous burden of litigation that they have borne." 32
Many other class members in that case-incumbent employees-received nothing but the potential benefits from future affirmative relief
set out in the consent decree. The only other class members to receive
any monetary compensation were ex-employees who were to share in
a settlement fund for back pay.
Other, more specific reasons given for awarding compensation to

the class representative are: responding to discovery requests; 33 being
the first to come forward with a complaint; 34 disruption of a personal
business caused by the substantial amount of time the plaintiff had to
devote to the litigation;35 and taking on class representation when an
individual claim could have been more quickly and easily settled.36

Although incentive awards are often approved when they are requested, 37 such awards have not been unanimously and unquestiona-

bly granted. Many courts have required a named plaintiff to exert
special effort-beyond that ordinarily expected of a litigant-to warrant an incentive award. For example, in Weseley v. Spear, Leeds &

Kellogg,38 the court noted that "[a]lthough it is laudable that plaintiff
undertook to prosecute this litigation, the court perceives no circum-

stances warranting a special award."'39 There are also cases that have
expressed reservations about the practice of awarding financial incen-

31. 128 F.R.D. 81, 85 (E.D. Mich. 1989), aff'd, 925 F.2d 1464 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 304 (1991).
32. Id.
33. See Golden v. Shulman, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,060, at 90,954 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 621 F. Supp. 27, 32 (E.D.
Pa. 1985).
34. See In re Dun & Bradstreet Credit Servs. Customer Litig., 130 F.R.D. 366, 374
(S.D. Ohio 1990).
35. See id.
36. See Luevano v. Campbell, 93 F.R.D. 68, 90 (D.D.C. 1981) ("A plaintiff should
not be penalized for having agreed to take on the mantle of class representation. An
individual settlement could most likely have been reached in this case far more quickly
than the twenty-three month period it took to hammer out the class relief, and a class
representative's willingness to delay individual relief in order to obtain relief for the class
should not be made the occasion for requiring the representation to waive individual
consideration of his or her claims.").
37. This is not so in cases where the motion for a bonus is perceived as a request by
the named plaintiff for a disproportionate share of the class settlement based on a
stronger individual claim.
38. 711 F. Supp. 713 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
39. Id. at 720; see also In re Gould Secs. Litig., 727 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
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tives, while at the same time approving a bonus in the particular
case.' ° For example, the court in EnterpriseEnergy Corp. v. Columbia
Gas Transmission Corp., 41 approved the award but expressed concern
with granting such bonuses arbitrarily. To allay its concern, the court
set out guidelines for determining whether the class representatives
had really "earned" the award. Specifically, the court noted three factors to consider: 1) whether the action led to a substantial benefit for
the class; 2) whether the named plaintiff assumed a substantial financial risk; and 3) whether the amount of time and effort spent by the
representative preparing for the litigation was beyond that ordinarily
expected of a litigant.42
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of
a $10,000 incentive fee to a named plaintiff in a securities class action
based on an economic risk analysis. 43 The court reasoned that recovery from a common fund for expenses is usually limited to necessary
expenses, such as attorney's fees." The court found no need to compensate the named plaintiff because, given the minimal risk for any
named plaintiff and the limited burden undertaken by the named
plaintiff in the specific case (a deposition which took a few hours), the
market would have produced another plaintiff willing to proceed
without seeking compensation.45
The analysis used by the Seventh Circuit does not, of course, foreclose the possibility of an incentive award for cases in which, because
of their difficult or sensitive nature, the market would not be likely to
produce another named plaintiff. Since the rationale for incentive
awards is to encourage named plaintiffs to prosecute class actions, the
economic incentive analysis of the Seventh Circuit is eminently sound,
presuming it is fairly applied. A financial incentive is a windfall to a
named plaintiff in cases where other plaintiffs are equally capable and
equally willing to serve. On the other hand, an incentive is needed in
(stating that, by bringing litigation, named plaintiffs disclaim any right to preferred treatment even though they undertake extra responsibilities).
40. See Women's Comm. for Equal Employment Opportunity, 76 F.R.D. at 181 (stating that practice could "run afoul of the named plaintiff's duty to negotiate fairly on
behalf of all members of the class").
41. 137 F.R.D. 240 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
42. Id. at 250; see also Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (E.D. Pa.) ("[T]he
named plaintiff's contribution to the progress of the litigation has been especially meritorious and has justified such an award."), appeal dismissed, 820 F.2d 592 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 947 (1987).
43. In re Continental Ill. Secs. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 571-72 (7th Cir. 1992)(citing
Rand, 926 F.2d 596).
44. Id. at 571.
45. Id. at 572.
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cases where a meritorious class action may otherwise never be
brought.
2. Concerns
There are a number of possible ethical problems arising from the
grant of an incentive award to named plaintiffs. However, the Committee finds these problems generally more theoretical than real. One
possibility is that the prospect of a financial incentive may encourage
meritless litigation. The Committee believes that this possibility is remote, for several reasons. First, there are currently rules in place
which deter meritless litigation, such as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure,46 and DR 7-102, which states that a lawyer shall
not "knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under
existing law. ' ' 47 Second, as stated above, the grant of a financial incentive award is far from a certainty. The Committee does not believe
that the mere possibility of a financial incentive will cause clients, or
their attorneys, to ignore the sanctions against frivolous litigation.
Another possible danger is that in the hope of obtaining an incentive award, attorneys may be tempted to solicit named representatives
and split the award with them. This raises the further prospect of
bidding wars among attorneys for named representatives.
Solicitation using the promise of an incentive award to encourage
plaintiffs to bring a lawsuit, however, would violate DR 2-103(a): "A
lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, seek professional employment
...from a person who has not sought advice regarding employment
of the lawyer in violation of any statute or existing court rule in the
judicial department in which the lawyer practices." 48 Indirect solici46. See generally Committee on Professional Responsibility, ProposedAmendments to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 47 REC. Ass'N B. CITY N.Y. 65 (1992).
47. N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, DR 7-102.
48. N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, DR 2-103(a). Several New York statutes and court rules may be implicated by a promise of an incentive
award. See N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 479, 485 (McKinney 1983) (prohibiting attorneys from
directly or indirectly "solicit[ing] ...legal business"). In addition, each of the four Appellate Division departments makes it a violation of its rules to violate any of the provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 22, §§ 603.2, 691.2, 806.2, 1022.17 (1992). The First Department further adds a rule
that prohibits an attorney from directly or indirectly "promis[ing], giv[ing], or
procur[ing] ... any valuable consideration to any person as an inducement to placing in
his hands ... any claim for the purpose of making a claim or bringing an action ......
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 22, § 603.2 (1990). An ethics opinion by the New
York State Bar Association cited each of these rules as being implicated in the context of
DR 2-103(a) where an attorney attempted to contact potential class members. N.Y. ST.
B. ASS'N COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Op. 499, 1978 WL 14162 at *2-3 (1978).
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tation through another attorney would also be unethical.4 9 Again the
Committee is unconvinced that the contingent possibility of a limited
financial incentive would encourage attorneys to violate the Disciplinary Rules concerning solicitation.
As to the possibility that financial incentives to named plaintiffs
could lead to fee-splitting with non-lawyers, again the rule prohibiting
such a practice is clear.5" It is true that one court has described incentive awards as "border[ing] on permitting a lay plaintiff to share in the
attorney's fees."5 " This would indeed be an arguable point if the incentive award were taken out of the amount set for attorneys' fees. In

fact, however, the incentive award and the award for attorneys' fees
are generally applied for and provided for separately, and hence do
not run afoul of the limitation on fee-splitting. 52 Again, to the extent

that there is a concern that the possibility of a financial incentive
could lead the lawyer to violate a clear disciplinary rule and split the
incentive award specifically granted to the plaintiff, we find this con-

cern unfounded: an attorney is unlikely to risk an ethical violation in
the hope of sharing an award that is far from a certainty and modest
even if granted.
Another potential undesirable consequence of incentives is the pos-

sibility that they will lead to bidding wars to attract plaintiffs. Once
lawyers begin to promise bonuses, plaintiffs could be prompted to sign
up with those who promise the highest amount. As one court has
stated:
The real danger [of incentive awards] is a potentially undesirable
precedent where every named plaintiff would expect a 'fee' or
'bounty' for the use of his or her name to create a class action. It is
not difficult to envision a scenario ...of prospective named plaintiffs becoming
involved in a bidding war ...with prospective class
53
counsel.

49. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(b) (1981); N.Y.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, DR 2-103(b). In fact, DR 2103(b) is even more directly on point if incentive awards for named plaintiffs are construed as fees for obtaining class clients for attorneys. DR 2-103(b) states that "[a] lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to
recommend or obtain employment by a client ...."
50. See N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, DR 3-102.
51. In re Gould Secs. Litig., 727 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
52. See, e.g., id.; Genden v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 700 F. Supp. 208
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Weseley v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 711 F. Supp. 713 (E.D.N.Y. 1989);
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 621 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
53. Gould Secs. Litig., 727 F. Supp. at 1209. One commentator has argued that bidding wars are actually more harmful to attorneys than to clients, and that an ethical
prohibition may be necessary to protect lawyers who would be pressured to grant a
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While the possibility of bidding wars is a concern, the Committee
does not believe that such a risk is serious enough to warrant a total
ban on incentive awards. Since the incentive award is not granted
until the class action has neared or reached completion, the trial court
can at that point assess whether any improprieties have occurred in
the retention of the attorney by the named plaintiff (or vice versa).

The court's denial of incentive awards in cases where it appears that
bidding wars have occurred should provide sufficient disincentive to
clients and attorneys who may be tempted to engage in such a
54

practice.
Finally, it has been argued that incentive awards may create a conflict between the class representatives and the other class members.
Incentive awards could encourage collusion and "suboptimal" class
settlements, because plaintiffs with something extra to gain are not
motivated to hold out for higher awards for the rest of the class."
However, the Committee believes that existing procedural requirements of notice to the class and judicial approval of a settlement provide sufficient safeguards against conflicts of interest and
unreasonable settlements. Because of the safeguards inherent in the
class action device, a ban on incentive awards is unwarranted.
B. Consultant Fees
1.

The Cases

Consultant fees are generally intended to compensate a plaintiff for
some special expertise which aided in a successful suit. For example,
in AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe,56 the court

awarded the class representative a bonus because of his expertise on
the subject of AAMCO parts, which were at issue in the litigation.
The court noted that the duties performed by the plaintiff went behigher financial incentive if they wanted to represent that client. See Thomas D. Morgan,
The Evolving Concept of ProfessionalResponsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977).
54. The attorney-client privilege would not prevent the court from determining the
propriety of the financial arrangement between the attorney and the named plaintiff. See
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 248 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(attorney-client privilege does not protect fee arrangements).
55. Weseley, 711 F. Supp. at 720; Franks v. Kroger Co., 649 F.2d 1216, 1227 (6th
Cir. 1981) (Merritt, J., concurring) ("We should not allow a class action device to be used
as a hammer at the head of the defendant for the purpose of extracting benefits for the
named plaintiffs at the expense of members of the class."); Jerold S. Solovy et al., The
Head of the Class, NAT'L LAW JOURNAL, Aug. 27, 1990, at 13 ("The primary difficulty
with incentive awards is that they raise the specter that named plaintiffs may 'sell out' the
interest of the class they purport to represent.").
56. 82 F.R.D. 405 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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yond those normally assumed by a class representative.5 7
Similarly, in Genden v. MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, s the
court allowed the named plaintiff in a securities fraud class action to
recover for "consultative services." The court found that the plaintiff,
who was also an attorney, had, by drawing upon his legal background, "played a valuable role for the ...

class ...

and should be

efforts." 59

remunerated for his
However, in at least one case where the court purported to compensate plaintiffs for consultative services, it failed to distinguish between
services requiring some sort of expertise and ordinary participation in
the litigation. In Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.,' the court claimed that
the named plaintiffs "provided valuable consultative assistance," but
described such assistance as "preparing for pretrial discovery" and
being "subject to extensive oral depositions," 6 -responsibilities that
any representative plaintiff would have to bear. If such ordinary services warranted compensation, then every class representative would
be entitled to compensation. The Committee believes that compensation to named plaintiffs for consultative assistance should be limited
to those cases in which the plaintiff performs services above and beyond those provided by the ordinary class representative.
2. Concerns
Awards are justified in cases like AAMCO where the representative
plaintiff actually provided valuable services over and above what
named plaintiffs would ordinarily be required to provide. In a case
like Bogosian, the court may have disguised a plaintiff's bonus by
describing it as payment for consultative services when in fact the
plaintiff had only performed those services any representative plaintiff
would have to contribute. It may be that the court granted a bonus
because it felt that such an incentive was necessary to produce a plaintiff to prosecute the class action. If that was so, it should have been
specifically stated by the court. Otherwise, it appears that the court
gave the plaintiff a windfall, perhaps at the expense of the rest of the
class.
A more particular problem that could arise exists in cases like
Genden where the named plaintiff is an attorney. In fact, at least one
57.
paring
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 409 (noting that plaintiff "personally performed extensive services in prethe proofs of damages" in an antitrust action).
700 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Id. at 210.
621 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Id. at 32.
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court has already noted the possibility of the appearance of impropriety in such a situation. In Lowenschuss v. C. G. Bluhdorn,62 the court
disqualified a class representative because he initiated the suit in a
dual capacity as both class counsel and class representative.
Although the plaintiff subsequently withdrew as counsel and arranged
for a substitute, he also contracted to be paid attorney's fees for his
continuing legal assistance in the case. The court found a conflict of
interest created by the fact that " 'the financial recovery for reasonable attorneys' fees would dwarf the individual's recovery as a member of the class.' "63
C. Disproportionate Share of Class Settlement
1. The Cases
There are cases in which the named plaintiff receives a disproportionate judgment compared to the rest of the class because the plaintiff has a better claim on the merits or has shown a greater injury.
However, courts are typically more reluctant to award bonuses in the
form of disproportionate shares of the class settlement than they are
to award "ordinary" incentive bonuses. In Women's Committee, for
example, the plaintiffs asserted that they had stronger claims than the
rest of the class, but the court's reasons for granting the higher award
were the same as those typically given for ordinary incentive awards:
the plaintiffs "earned" the award because the class was going to receive significant relief and because "plaintiffs ... instituted significant
measures and undertook significant obligations . . . [including] or-

ganizing and funding [the plaintiff organization], retention of counsel,
filing and prosecution of administrative complaints, and eventually
compliance with defendants' discovery requests.""
2.

Concerns
It is apparent from the number of cases which have criticized the
award of a disproportionate share of recovery to named plaintiffs, that
62. 78 F.R.D. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
63. Id. at 678 (quoting Turoff v. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357 (6th Cir. 1976)); see also
Cotchett v. Avis Rent-A-Car, 56 F.R.D. 549, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (stating that partner
of lawyer for class could not be an adequate representative of class, because that would
create a conflict of interest for class representative, who would benefit financially from
increased attorneys' fees, which would not be in the interest of the class). Close connections between class counsel and the named plaintiff are often accepted, however. See
Lewis v. Goldsmith, 95 F.R.D. 15 (D.N.J. 1982) (class counsel is uncle of named plaintiff); see generally Ronan E. Degnan, Adequacy of Representation in Class Actions, 60
CALIF. L. REV. 705 (1972).
64. Women's Comm. for Equal Employment Opportunity, 76 F.R.D. at 181-82.
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courts seem to find this type of award much more problematic than
"ordinary" incentive awards. The practice is usually criticized as creating conflicts between the representative plaintiff and the class members. As one court stated, "the possibility of an antagonism in
interests as between plaintiffs and other class members seeking advancement could not be ignored."65
Courts reason that if the plaintiff wanted to pursue individual
claims disproportionate to those of the class, then he or she should
have brought an individual action. The plaintiff "may very well have
had stronger claims than most class members, but he joined in bringing this action as a class action and, by so doing, he had disclaimed
any right to a preferred position in the settlement.1 66 As a fiduciary,
the class representative has an obligation to protect the interests of the
class with scrupulous fairness and not to prefer his or her recovery
above that of all other members of the class.
D.

Conclusions

The most egregious ethical violations that could arise from incentive awards are already causes for disciplinary action or other sanctions against an attorney (e.g., frivolous lawsuits, unbidden
solicitation, and fee splitting). Generally speaking, the Committee believes that these existing rules sufficiently regulate the problems that
may arise from incentive awards, and that any rule of law prohibiting
incentive awards would unduly inhibit the prosecution of class
actions.
One method of balancing the benefits of incentive awards against
their possible danger is for courts to assure that such awards are modest, and thus do not create an incentive so great that an attorney may
be tempted to risk the violation of an existing disciplinary rule.67 In
addition, such awards should only be made when the court supervising the award concludes, after taking all factors into account, that
such an award is appropriate because of the special circumstances of
the individual case. Awards should not be made as a matter of
course. They should be granted only when the court finds unusual
65. Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 659 (2d Cir. 1982).
66. Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615, 632 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983); see Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1147
(11th Cir. 1983); Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1176 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 967 (1976).
67. See Sofia C. Hubscher, Making It Worth Plaintiffs' While: Extra Incentive
Awards to Named Plaintiffs in Class Action Employment DiscriminationSuits, 23 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 463, 464 (1992) ("[P]rudent use of incentive awards can nullify concerns regarding collusive activity and sheer mercenary behavior").
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factors such as that the named plaintiff made an unusual contribution
to the case (e.g., particular expertise or extraordinary time commitments), or that it was unlikely that other plaintiffs would have
brought or continued the class action. Courts should also take into
account whether there was unusual personal risk and whether the
statutory scheme suggests that Congress intended to encourage private class actions. These principles would allow some compensation
in cases where it is justified by the particular facts of the case. When
used prudently, a financial award to named plaintiffs can serve a positive good: it can create a proper incentive to render active assistance
during the investigative stage and at trial, and thereby promote strong
case preparation and increase the chances for the class action's
success.
III. The Rand Case: Plaintiffs' Responsibility for
the Costs of Litigation
Under the common law, the offense called "maintenance" was
committed when a lawyer provided the money to prosecute or defend
an action. Maintenance was viewed as a lawyer's "scheme" to stir up
litigation and, at various times, was considered a crime. 68 Disciplinary Rule 5-103(b) of the New York Code carries forward the prohibition of maintenance with one qualification: an attorney can advance
costs on behalf of a client if the client remains responsible for the
expenses. 69 DR 5-103(b)(2) provides a further exception that a lawyer
representing an indigent client on a pro bono basis may pay court
costs and reasonable expenses of litigation on behalf of the client,
without any expectation of reimbursement. Model Rule 1.8(E) goes
one step further by permitting attorneys to advance costs in all cases,
with repayment contingent on the outcome of the litigation. New
York has not yet adopted Model Rule 1.8(E).70
68. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1106 (4th ed. 1957).
69. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§§ 1.8:602, 1.8:1101 (2d ed. 1990).
70. New York's DR 5-103(b) now reads:
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to the client,
except that:
1) A lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including
court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and
costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses.
2) Unless prohibited by law or rule of court, a lawyer representing an indigent client on a pro bono basis may pay court costs and reasonable expenses of
litigation on behalf of the client.
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In County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co. ,71 a district court
held that a federal court could ignore DR 5-103(b) in a class action,
thus allowing the attorney for the plaintiff class to advance the costs
of litigation, without the client being responsible for repayment if the
suit is unsuccessful.7 2 In Lilco, the court held that New York could
be enjoined under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution from attempting to enforce DR 5-103(b) against a New York
lawyer who represented class plaintiffs in federal court.7 3 The court
stated that the ethical standards imposed upon attorneys in federal
court are a matter of federal law. 74 The court recognized that the
"reality of class litigation" is that it is unusual for class lawyers to
seek to recover legal fees from named representatives in the event that
the suit is unsuccessful." The court criticized DR 5-103(b) as an
"outmoded and unrealistic concept of ethics" and concluded that the
application of DR 5-103(b) would unduly inhibit the prosecution of
class actions, because it would make it almost impossible to find
named plaintiffs willing to prosecute the action.7 6 Consequently, the
court found DR 5-103(b) to be contrary to the policy of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23, which was to encourage the prosecution of
meritorious class actions.
In Rand v. Monsanto Co.,7 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held, consistent with Lilco, that DR 5-103(b) was inapplicable to a
class action. Rand, the named plaintiff, thought he had a securities
fraud claim for $100,000. He had apparently agreed with his lawyers
to be responsible for a maximum of $25,000 in expenses. During a
deposition, defense counsel pointed out that Rand's individual claim
could not exceed $1,135 and that Rand's attorneys had so stated in
answering an interrogatory. Following defense counsel's statement,
Rand expressed his unwillingness to be responsible for the litigation
expenses. The district court found Rand an inadequate class representative because his unwillingness to be responsible for litigation
costs indicated to the court that he was not committed to vigorously
prosecuting the claim.78
N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, DR 5-103(b).
71. 710 F. Supp. 1407 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990).
72. Id. at 1414-15.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1413 (citing In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643-45 & n.6 (1985)).
75. Id.
76. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp at 1414.
77. 926 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 1991).
78. Rand v. Monsanto, No. 85-C9087, 1989 WL 27458 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 1989),
rev'd, 926 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1991).
As shown by Rand, the question of whether attorneys are permitted to bear the costs of
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In reversing the district court, the court of appeals asserted that
Rand may have been an unsuitable representative if he was unwilling
to pay anything, but that the lower court had erred in finding him
unsuitable simply because he was unwilling to pay everything.7 9 The
court stated that "no person need be willing to stake his entire fortune
for the benefit of strangers", and that "no (sane) person would pay the

entire costs of a securities class action in exchange for a maximum
benefit of $1,135."80 The court reasoned that since class actions typically assemble claims too small to be worth separate litigation, it
would be impossible in most cases to find a plaintiff willing to risk the
entire litigation cost for the chance to obtain a small recovery.8 I It
therefore concluded that DR 5-103(b) was unworkable in the class
action context."2 The court characterized DR 5-103(b) as "long in
the tooth", and unduly restrictive in comparison with Model Rule
1.8(E), which permits lawyers to "advance court costs and expenses
of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter. 8 s3 Thus, the court found DR 5-103(b) "inconsistent with Rule 23" and stated that it "may not be applied to class

actions."

84

a class action has relevance beyond an ethical context. In order to certify the class, the
court must find that the named plaintiff is an adequate representative. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(a)(4). One aspect of adequacy is the ability to fund the litigation. See Judith L.
Maute, Comment, Class Certification: Relevance of Plaintiff'sFinances and Fee Arrangements with Counsel, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 70 (1978). If the attorney is allowed to fund the
litigation, then the attorney's finances can be considered in determining whether the class
is adequately represented. See Cannon v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 433 N.Y.S.2d
378 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 451 N.Y.S.2d 817 (App. Div. 1982)
(stating that, where counsel is permitted to fund the litigation, "whether ...counsel can
and will pay the expenses of this suit, rather than whether plaintiffs can individually
afford this litigation, becomes the relevant question"). Obviously, if the finances of an
attorney or law firm can be considered, it is much easier to satisfy the requirement of
adequate representation, which is crucial to class certification. See generally 2 WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 901.16 (1988).
79. Rand, 926 F.2d at 601; see also Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718,
728 (11th Cir. 1987).
Where the class is represented by competent and zealous counsel, class certification should not be denied simply because of a perceived lack of subjective interest on the part of the named plaintiffs, unless their participation is so minimal
that they virtually have abdicated to their attorneys the conduct of the case. To
require less would permit attorneys essentially to serve as class representatives;
to require more could well prevent the vindication of the legal rights of the
absent class members under the guise of protecting those rights.
Id.
80. Rand, 926 F.2d at 599.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 600.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 600.
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Although the court's holding in Rand was based on the conflict
between a local ethics rule and a federal rule, the outcome may have
been influenced by the court's apparent disapproval of DR 5-103(b):
"Indeed, so far as we can tell, DR 5-103(b) itself serves no good purpose. The ABA has jettisoned, and the states are in the process of
replacing, this relic of the rules against champerty and barratry." 85 In
a concurring opinion, Judge Kanne disagreed with the majority's view
of DR 5-103(b):
I do not see this relic as worthless for I do not believe that the
legal profession, or the American public which it serves, is better
off when lawyers are first given authority to foment litigation and
then8 are
permitted to carry on that litigation at their own cost and
6
risk.

Judge Kanne nonetheless concurred with the majority because he
agreed that DR 5-103(b) was inconsistent with the policies behind
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and hence that the Supremacy
Clause prevented the application of the Disciplinary Rule to a Federal
class action.87
The Third Circuit, in Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy Limited,"8 held,
consistent with Rand and Lilco, that there was no impropriety in an
attorney's financing a class action. The court relied on a different
analysis, however. It noted that DR 5-103(b) provided an exception
for pro bono cases, and argued that it was unfair and unreasonable to
allow attorneys to finance pro bono class actions but not other class
actions. The court concluded that "while functioning as class plaintiffs the rich are entitled to the same privileges as the poor."8 9
At least one court has held, however, that DR 5-103(b) is enforceable within the federal class action context, though the decision predates the recent trend of cases relying on the policies of Rule 23 and
the Supremacy Clause. In In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litiga85. Rand, 926 F.2d at 600.
86. Id. at 603 (Kanne, J., concurring).
87. For an excellent commentary on the conflict between state ethical codes and the
practice of lawyers in Federal courts, see Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and
Federal Practice: Emerging Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 969 (1992).
88. 725 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1983).
89. Id. at 210; see also In re Oracle Sec., 136 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (permitting
class attorneys to incur out-of-pocket expenses); Cannon v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 433 N.Y.S.2d 378 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) ("In this case the plaintiffs' counsel has
stated for the record that the legal fees are being borne by him on a contingent fee basis.
Such an arrangement has been held appropriate in a class action context."), vacated on
other grounds, 451 N.Y.S.2d 817 (App. Div. 1982).
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tion,9 ° the court held that an arrangement between class representatives and their lawyers, whereby the representatives formally agreed
to be responsible for costs but were told informally that the attorneys
would not seek to recover costs if they were unsuccessful, was sufficient grounds to deny class certification. The court characterized the
purposes behind DR 5-103(b) as "to prevent the attorney from acquiring a financial interest in the litigation which might interfere with
his/her exercise of independent professional judgment, especially
when it comes to deciding whether to settle the case." 91
It thus appears that the resolution of the apparent conflict between
DR 5-103(b) and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
depends, to an extent, upon how one feels about large class action
litigation. Clearly, the recent trend in the courts is to support these
suits and to do away with traditional barriers such as DR 5-103(b).
States, as well, are increasingly adopting the Model Rules, effectively
eliminating DR 5-103(b). The rule appears to be incompatible with
the modern class action. Insisting on ultimate client responsibility
would render many class action suits impracticable and have the effect of limiting the access of legitimate claims, particularly those
where losses to individual claimants are very small.
The Committee therefore agrees with the recent trend in court decisions that DR 5-103(b) should be inapplicable to class actions. Indeed, while these opinions have dealt mainly with federal class actions
brought under Rule 23, the Committee believes that DR 5-103(b) is
equally inconsistent with the liberal spirit of the New York State class
93
action provision, CPLR 901.92 At least one state court has so held.
We conclude that the restrictions imposed by DR 5-103(b) should not
be applied to any class action. We therefore suggest that DR 5103(b), to the extent it is retained at all, be amended to include an
exception for class actions.
It could be argued that DR 5-103(b) is necessary to prevent an attorney from incurring excessive expenses that would then be assessed
from the award to the class. DR 5-103(b) is not necessary to guard
against such a risk, however; judicial scrutiny of class action expenses
is currently required, independent of DR 5-103(b). To the extent
there may be a risk that an attorney's expenses may be excessive, the
court can reduce them pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 and relevant state rules, which mandate that any fees and expenses awarded
90. 93 F.R.D. 485 (D. Md. 1982).
91. Id. at 490.
92. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 901 (McKinney 1993).
93. Cannon, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
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in a class action must be approved by the court after notice to all class
members and a hearing. To the extent that there is a perceived, theoretical risk that some plaintiff's attorney will settle a class action simply because the expenses are too high, the requirement of judicial
approval for any class action settlement eliminates any such hypothetical risk.
IV.

Plaintiffs' Management Committees - Attorney-Investors and
Creative Financingof Class Actions
The Agent Orange class action involved claims on behalf of several
hundred thousand Vietnam veterans who were allegedly injured by
the use of defoliants by the U.S. military in Vietnam. A Plaintiffs
Management Committee ("PMC") had been established early in the
case, but budget problems almost immediately threatened the continued prosecution of the action.94 An agreement was reached among
the members of the PMC that allowed some attorneys to advance
funds necessary to prosecute the litigation, in return for a promise
that they would receive three times their investment out of any fund
approved for payment of attorneys' fees. 9" The effect of the treble
repayment was that those attorneys who invested money rather than
time in the case were relatively well-compensated, while those who
invested time and effort rather than money were relatively poorly
compensated.96 For example, under the agreement, one investor was
entitled to an award twelve times greater than that which the district
judge ultimately determined to be reasonable, while one non-investor's award would have been almost a million dollars less than he
would have received in the absence of an agreement.9"
The district court judge98 was not informed of the written agreement of the members of the PMC until the fee application was submitted after settlement of the action. The court, following a challenge
of the agreement by a member of the PMC who stood to get a much
smaller fee than he otherwise would have, approved the agreement as
a necessary part of a flexible approach to applying ethical standards to
class action litigation.99 Thus, Judge Weinstein wrote:
94. Johnson, supra note 4, at 549 n.35.
95. "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. at 1454.
96. Id. at 1455.
97. Id.
98. The district court judge was Judge Weinstein, the same judge who held in Lilco
that ethical standards in federal courts are a matter of federal law. County of Suffolk v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1407 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
99. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
rev'd, 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987).
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[The] ethical principles [contained in the Code and the Model
Rules] are not dispositive. The focus of Rule 23(e) [the provision
providing for court approval of settlements on notice to the class]
is prevention of harm to the rights of the class, a consideration that
is independent of, albeit usually consistent with, the Code and
Model Rule standards. In addition, general professional ethics
guidelines may require interpretation in the class action setting because of the special problems posed by this kind of litigation.l°°
Judge Weinstein relied on the reasoning of Judge Adams in the
Corn Securities litigation, wherein Judge Adams stated:
Courts confronting an ethical problem in the class action setting
must focus on two points. First, courts cannot mechanically transpose to class actions the rules developed in the traditional lawyerclient setting context; and second, a resolution of such issues would
appear to call for a balancing process that in most cases should be
undertaken initially by the district court. °1
Judge Weinstein went on to analyze the problems raised by the
PMC's expense agreement on two bases: (1) whether the allocation of
funds in the fee agreement reflected unethical fee splitting among attorneys not in the same firm; and (2) whether the agreement created
an impermissible stake in the lawsuit giving rise to a conflict of interest between the attorneys and the members of the class.
Judge Weinstein determined that DR 2-107, which then prohibited
02
fee-splitting outside a law firm, was not violated by the agreement.
He reasoned that the PMC was an ad hoc law firm, so allocations
among PMC members involved only those risks associated with any
law partnership agreement which might allocate fees among members
03
of the firm.1
On the conflict of interest question, Judge Weinstein found that the
promised return to the attorney-investors probably involved the ac100. Id. at 1457.
101. Id. (quoting In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 163 (3d. Cir.
1984) (Adams, J., concurring)).
102. Id. at 1459.
103. Id. at 1458. Disciplinary Rule 2-107 of the New York Code of Professional Responsibility was amended as of September 1, 1990, to change the requirement of DR 2107(a)(2) that any permitted division of fees must be in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer. The rule now permits division of fees without regard to actual
services performed if both lawyers, by a writing to the client, assume joint responsibility
for the representation. Thus, DR 2-107(a) now reads in its entirety:
(a) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is
not a partner in or associate of the lawyer's law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a division of fees will be made.
(2) The division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or,
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quisition of an interest in the lawsuit in contravention of DR 5-103
(and Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules). However he found it necessary to
approve the agreement, in order to avoid the "creation of disincentives that in individual instances may unnecessarily discourage counsel from undertaking the expensive and protracted complex
multiparty litigation often needed to vindicate the rights of a class.""°
Judge Weinstein noted that, based on his observations, he had no reason to believe the fee sharing agreement had any effect on the decision
to settle the case.105 He also remarked that he doubted whether the
money could have been obtained from the attorney-investors on more
favorable terms. 06
Judge Weinstein's decision was appealed to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, which reversed, 10 7 finding the, fee sharing agreement unenforceable. The court of appeals stated:
The ultimate inquiry, therefore, in examining fee agreements and
setting fee awards under the equitable fund doctrine and Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(e), is the effect an agreement could have on the rights of
a class. Because we find that the agreement here conflicts substantially with the principles of reasonable compensation in common
fund actions .

. .,

and that it places class counsel in a potentially

conflicting
position in relation to the interests of the class, we
08
reverse.1

The court expressed a concern that the fee sharing agreement was
inconsistent with the lodestar guidelines established for fee allocations
in class actions. 0 9 The court reasoned that the lodestar approach was
necessary to "protect the interests of the class by tying fees to the
by a writing given to the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the
representation.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not exceed reasonable compensation for
all legal services they rendered the client.
N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5, DR 2-107(a). For a discussion of this amendment, see Proposed Amendments to the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility, 42 REC. Ass'N B. CITY N.Y. 323, 335-37 (1987) (Executive
Committee Statement). Under the amended DR 2-107, the fee allocation arrangement in
Agent Orange would have been permissible, even assuming that the ethical provision in
the New York Code could be applicable to a federal class action. Cf "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. at 1459.
104. 611 F. Supp. at 1460.
105. Id. at 1461.
106. Id.
107. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 926 (1987).
108. Id. at 222.
109. Id.
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actual effort made by the attorney to benefit the class. ' 1 0 The lodestar guidelines have been described as follows:
Under the lodestar approach, a court engages in a two-step feesetting process. The first step is to establish the lodestar figure, by
multiplying the number of hours worked by the attorney times the
rate normally charged by an attorney of like skill. The second step
is to increase (or decrease) the lodestar amount by application of
an appropriate multiplier, if any, based upon such factors as the
quality of counsel's work, the risk of the litigation, and the complexity of the issues involved. None of the factors deemed relevant
under the lodestar approach directly prove the issue of whether the
attorney has advanced large amounts of money needed to finance
the litigation for substantial periods of time. While expenses incurred by an attorney on behalf of a class are reimbursed under the
common or equitable fund doctrine as an element of compensation
separate from fees, they typically are paid at a flat out-of-pocket
rate. No allowance is made, in the usual case, for the fact that
advances have long been outstanding and have therefore given rise
to an opportunity cost or borrowing cost."'
The Second Circuit in Agent Orange rejected relevant precedent in
the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, that permitted
counsel to divide lodestar fee allocations, to the extent these cases
sanctioned a fee sharing agreement that does not generally comport
with lodestar principles.1"2 Read strictly, the Second Circuit's decision would permit some fee sharing agreements, but would prohibit
one that promised a "return on investment," such as the Agent Orange arrangement.
Further, the court specifically rejected the district court's concern
about creating disincentives to class attorneys, and noted that the risk
to the interests of the class as to timing of settlements was particularly
egregious in the Agent Orange case." 3 The court concluded that, in
the context of a settlement not particularly favorable to the class, it
was unseemly to permit an attorney to get twelve times what the district court had determined was the fair value of his services.' 14 Finally, in a conclusory manner and without citation to authority, the
court rejected the district court's assertion that the PMC constituted
110. Id.
I 11. Johnson, supra note 4, at 571-73 (citations omitted). See also City of Detroit v.

Grinnell Corp., 575 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1977) (amending 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977)).
112. "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 223.

113. Id. at 224.
114. Id. at 225.
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an ad hoc law firm.' 1 5
An argument can be made that the Second Circuit's rejection of the
Agent Orange financing scheme was driven by the following facts: (1)
the settlement was generally unfavorable for the plaintiffs; (2) the settlement had been reached at a relatively early stage in the litigation
making the treble multiplier unduly favorable to the attorney-investors; and (3) the attorneys entered into the agreement without the
knowledge and prior approval of the courts." 6 In other words, the
Second Circuit's decision may be limited to its peculiar facts, and may
not have been intended to thwart all creative financing arrangements
in class actions. The court of appeals seemed to contemplate fee sharing agreements that might be acceptable when it stated:
We do agree with the district court's ruling that in all future
class actions counsel must inform the court of the existence of a fee
sharing agreement at the time it is formulated. This holding may
well diminish many of the dangers posed to the rights of the class.
Only by reviewing the agreement prospectively will the district
courts be able to prevent potential conflicts from arising, either by
disapproving improper agreements or by reshaping them with the
assistance of counsel to conform more closely with the principles of
Grinnell I and Grinnell II [the cases establishing the lodestar
guidelines]. In the present case, however, where the district court
was not made aware of the agreement, and the potential for a conflict of interest arising was substantial, the adoption of a rule for
future cases in no way alleviates the fatal flaws of this agreement
and does not offset the need for its invalidation.' '7
The court of appeals also expressed sympathy with class counsel
"regarding the business decisions they must make in operating an efficient and manageable practice," and acknowledged that "a certain
flexibility on the court's part is essential."''
We hope that the Second Circuit's decision in Agent Orange will
not be read as the "death knell" for creative financing of class ac115. Id. at 226.
116. As discussed in Judge Weinstein's opinion in the Agent Orange case, the judges of
the Eastern District of New York now interpret Local Civil Rule 5(a) to require all fee
sharing arrangements to be filed with the court as soon as they are agreed to by counsel.
611 F. Supp. at 1464.
117. "Agent Orange" Prod.Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 226. Grinnell I and GrinnellII are
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974), and City of Detroit v.
Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977), respectively. Grinnell I and Grinnell II
adopted the lodestar formula for fee computations in class actions.
118. "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 225.

854

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XX

tions.IIIRather, we think that the opinion should stand for the salutary proposition that not all risks from unethical practices will be
overlooked in the interest of encouraging class actions. The term
"class action" is not a talisman which can be used to permit all manner of questionable conduct by class attorneys. In our view, the most
objectionable aspects of the agreement in Agent Orange were: (1) the
failure to obtain prior court approval for the fee allocation agreement; 120 and (2) the fact that attorney-investors would have been
compensated far beyond the value of their investment to the litigation,
and far beyond the opportunity cost of the money they invested. We
do not believe that the Agent Orange opinion should be read to prohibit all forms of creative financing of class actions simply because
such arrangements may not be in lockstep with the lodestar guidelines. Where an agreement, viewed prospectively, provides for reasonable reimbursement of the time-value of monetary advances, the
approval of such an agreement will serve the important social policy
of promoting the prosecution of a class action (which may not otherwise be financed), with little or no risk that the class or any class
counsel will suffer prejudice. It is this type of agreement which
should not be foreclosed by the Agent Orange litigation. 2 '

119. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 585 (expressing concerns on this point and quoting
from In re "Agent Orange" Prod.Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 223-34).
120. See "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. at 1454 (stating that a "sunshine rule is essential to protect the interests of the public, the class, and the honor of the
legal profession.").
121. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 587.
The type of fee allocation agreement most likely to pass scrutiny is one that
links the payment of interest on advanced expenses to a reasonable market standard, and that preserves, as far as possible, the correlation between the fee received and the work performed. Among other things, an agreement in
conformance with these limitations will minimize the risk of public misunderstanding as to the interests of class counsel.
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